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Some researchers argue that the modified Stroop task (MST) can be employed to
rule out feigning. According to these authors, modified Stroop interference effects are
beyond conscious control and therefore indicative of genuine psychopathology. We
examined this assumption using a within-subject design. In the first session, students
(N = 22) responded honestly, while in the second session they were asked to read
a vignette about test anxiety and then fake this condition. During both sessions,
we administered an MST consisting of neutral, anxiety-related, and test anxiety-
related words. Participants also completed the Self-Report Symptom Inventory (SRSI;
Merten et al., 2016) that focuses on over-reporting of pseudosymptoms. Our feigning
instructions were successful in that students succeeded in generating the typical MST
effect by providing longer response latencies on anxiety related (r = 0.43) and test
anxiety-related (r = 0.31) words, compared with neutral words. Furthermore, students
endorsed significantly more pseudosymptoms on the SRSI (r = 0.62) in the feigning
session than in the honest control condition. We conclude that the MST effect is not
immune to feigning tendencies, while the SRSI provides promising results that require
future research.
Keywords: feigning, over-reporting, test anxiety, SRSI, modified Stroop task
INTRODUCTION
The modified Stroop task (MST) is widely used in research on various psychological problems.
For example, the MST has been applied in investigating the cognitive underpinnings of addiction,
such as alcoholism (Kramer and Goldman, 2003) or gambling (Boyer and Dickerson, 2003).
Moreover, it is also used in evaluations of treatments in patients with eating disorders (Ball et al.,
2004), and among sex offenders (Price and Hanson, 2007). However, the MST has been the most
frequently applied in research on anxiety symptoms (see Mathews and MacLeod, 1985; Richards
et al., 1992; Lovett, 2005, for reviews). In this task, participants have to name the color of neutral-
and anxiety-related words as quickly as possible, while disregarding the content of the words.
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Typically, participants with high anxiety levels show longer
reaction times for threatening than for neutral words. The MST
effect is highly specific (Mathews and MacLeod, 1985) and
has been documented in patients with obsessive–compulsive
disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, social
phobia (SP), and specific phobias (Becker et al., 2001). The
effect is often conceptualized as reflecting the attentional bias
that anxious people have toward threatening stimuli (Mogg and
Marden, 1990).
The specificity of the MST effect led researchers to test
its sensitivity to intentionally feigned symptoms. For example,
Buckley et al. (2003) administered the MST to actors instructed
to feign PTSD, healthy controls, and patients with genuine PTSD
(N = 18). Although the overall reaction time of actors (n = 6) was
slower than that of healthy controls, the actors did not display the
typical MST effect that was observed in the subsample of PTSD
patients. It might also be important to note that in one of the
previous studies, Buckley et al. (2002) did not find the specific
MST effect, but rather an overall slowing down in the PTSD
group (Buckley et al., 2002). However, the authors concluded
that “reaction-time-based information-processing tasks such as
the Stroop may be harder to fake than face valid self-report
instruments” (Buckley et al., 2003, p. 64). Recent studies have
drawn on this argument so as to exclude feigning as a scenario.
For example, Constans et al. (2014) administered the MST to
veterans with PTSD who engaged or did not engage in symptom
over-reporting measured using the Miller Forensic Assessment
of Symptoms Test (M-FAST; Miller, 2001). The over-reporters
exhibited a stronger rather than a weaker MST effect when
compared with non-over-reporters. Based on these results, the
authors concluded that symptom over-reporting in their sample
reflected heightened distress rather than intentional feigning.
Thus, the MST effect has been used to rule out feigning.
However, Cannon (2003) pointed out that “specificity” of
MST effects may reflect current concerns that people have (e.g.,
anxiety symptoms). For example, Mathews and MacLeod (1985)
demonstrated that patients who worried mostly about physical
harm were especially slow in color naming words describing
physical threat, while patients who mostly worried about social
threat were especially slow in color naming social threat-related
words. If true, one would predict that people who feign symptoms
will exhibit delayed reactions specifically for words referring to
feigning (e.g., lie, fake) to the extent that they have concerns
about being detected. Cannon (2003) found, indeed, that students
instructed to feign mild brain trauma symptoms performed
significantly worse on words pertaining to feigning relative to
honest controls. With this in mind, one could attribute Buckley
et al.’s failure to obtain an MST effect in actors feigning PTSD to
actors’ indifference toward their task words. Perhaps, they were
not familiar enough with PTSD and/or they may have found the
possibility that their feigning might be detected not important.
In the current study, we wanted to test whether the MST
effect occurs in students instructed to feign test anxiety. We
chose test anxiety as a target for feigning because tests are an
important feature of students’ lives. Thus, students have to cope
with frequent examinations and due to the pressure to perform
well, they often experience heightened levels of stress during
tests (Lawson, 2006). Accordingly, test anxiety, i.e., a chronic
preoccupation (worry) with and physiological responsiveness
to test situations, is a widespread problem among students
worldwide (Nelson et al., 2014). Recent studies (e.g., Yeo et al.,
2016) reported that the prevalence estimates for test anxiety in
students range from 10 to 40%. On the other hand, conditions
such as test anxiety, dyslexia, and ADHD, which are correlated
(Nelson et al., 2014), are feigned on a non-trivial scale because
doing so may result in incentives (i.e., special academic privileges,
such as extra time for completing exams; e.g., Musso and Gouvier,
2012). Given their experience with stressful exams, one would
therefore expect that students would find it relatively easy to feign
an extreme form of test anxiety.
Students who suffer from high test anxiety exhibit higher
reactivity to test-related stimuli (Keogh et al., 2004). This suggests
that individuals who truly suffer from test anxiety will display the
MST effect. Indeed, these individuals have been found to provide
longer reaction times on Stroop trials with relevant threat words
(e.g., test, inept) than on trials with neutral words (e.g., MacLeod
and Rutherford, 1992). In the current study, we examined
whether this pattern can be simulated by non-test anxious
students who feign test anxiety. To establish that participants
did indeed comply with feigning instructions, we administered
the Self-Report Symptom Inventory (SRSI; Merten et al., 2016).
The SRSI is a recently developed measure of symptom over-
reporting and includes two main scales, one consisting of genuine
symptoms and the other of pseudosymptoms scale. Both scales
cover a wide range of psychological (e.g., anxiety, depression) and
physical (e.g., pain) complaints. People with authentic complaints
endorse more genuine symptoms than pseudosymptoms, while
the reverse is true for people who feign their complaints (Merten
et al., 2016). We examined whether feigning instructions will
cause heightened levels of pseudosymptom endorsement on the
SRSI. Finally, we also included the Brief Symptom Inventory-18
(BSI-18; Derogatis, 2001) in order to screen for general distress
among students.
Hypothesis
According to the aforementioned findings, in the current study,
we anticipated that the students, when not instructed about
the task, would not show any abnormalities in their response
latencies regardless the word type. In contrary, when instructed
to feign test anxiety, we expected that students would exhibit
a corresponding MST effect. Furthermore, we foresaw that the
symptom endorsement on SRSI would be considerably amplified
in the second session compared with the neutral, uninstructed,
testing.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Using the effect size (Cohen’s d = 1.151) reported by Buckley et al.
(2003) and with α set at 0.05 and β at 0.95, the lower bound
1Comparison of the Actors and Non-anxious group. Corresponding r value
being 0.49.
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sample size was found to be 13. Originally, the study included 28
participants from Maastricht University and Hogeschool Zuyd,
Netherlands. However, to ensure that participants did not in any
way suffer from genuine test anxiety or any other closely related
form of anxiety (e.g., social anxiety; Muris, 2002), potential
participants were prescreened. People with high test anxiety
typically report high trait anxiety levels, which reflects relatively
stable general anxiety proneness (Spielberger, 1972; Keogh and
French, 2001). Thus, we administered the Spielberger State-Trait-
Anxiety-Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger et al., 1970), using a
cut-off score of 46 (see Fisher and Durham, 1999). Potential
participants who scored above that cut-point were excluded. The
mean STAI score was 33.85 (SD = 6.95), and two participants
were excluded. We decided to include all the participants who
successfully passed the pre-screening for two reasons: First, the
robustness of statistical tests usually requires a minimum of
20 participants per cell, and second, we could not predict how
many participants would proceed with the study, and how many
would withdraw their participation. As an additional check on
high distress symptoms among participants, we administered the
BSI-18 (see below). Four participants scored above the cut-off
point of 11, and they were also excluded from further analysis.
The final sample included 22 undergraduates (14 women).
Their mean age was 21 years (SD = 1.73). Students were given
two vouchers of €7.5 euros each, or two credit points. The study
involved two sessions, each session lasting about 1 h. The study
was approved by the standing ethical committee of the Faculty
of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University (ECP-159
03 12 2015).
Measurements
Brief Symptom Inventory-18 (BSI-18; Derogatis, 2001)
The Dutch version of the BSI-18 is designed to measure general
distress and is often used as a screen for psychological problems
(Meijer et al., 2011). Typical items are: “I feel like I am going to
faint,” “I feel worthless,” and “I am so restless that I can’t sit still.”
Respondents evaluate items on a 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much)
Likert scale. Total scores range from 0 to 72, with higher scores
indicating higher general distress (Meijer et al., 2011). Cronbach’s
alpha of the BSI-18 in the current study was 0.72. We employed
a cut-off of 11 in order to eliminate participants with clinically
significant levels of distress (De Beurs, 2011).
The Self-Report Symptom Inventory (SRSI; Merten
et al., 2016)
The SRSI consists of two main scales with 50 symptom items
each. One scale lists genuine symptoms (e.g., “I am often
exhausted”), while the other scale lists pseudosymptoms (e.g.,
“On some days my left arm is good for nothing, on other
days the right one is useless”). Both main scales include five
subscales that gauge plausible (potentially genuine) or unlikely
(probably non-authentic) manifestations of cognitive complaints,
depression, pain, somatic, and anxiety/posttraumatic stress
disorder symptoms. The rationale behind the SRSI is that honest
participants/patients will endorse more genuine symptoms than
pseudosymptoms, whereas this differential endorsement pattern
will be absent in people who feign complaints. Previous studies
on the psychometric merits of the SRSI (e.g., Merten et al., 2016)
found supportive evidence for this rationale. For both scales total
scores range from 0 to 50. For the pseudosymptoms scale, a cut
point of 9 has been proposed (Merten et al., 2016). At this cut-
point, sensitivity is 0.80 and specificity is 1.00. In the current
study, Cronbach’s alpha for the full scale was 0.76 (first session;
T1) and 0.93 (second session; T2). For the bogus symptoms, a cut
point has been proposed of 9 (Merten et al., 2016). At this cut
point, sensitivity is 0.80 and specificity is 1.00, which is probably
an overestimation caused by using a non-clinical sample (van
Impelen et al., 2014).
The Modified Stroop Task
This task was created using an E-prime application, version
2.0.10.353 (see pstnet.com), and its word stimuli were presented
on a computer screen (41.1 by 40.2 cm) to the participants. Words
were presented 1000 ms after a fixation cross in the center of
the screen, and participants had unlimited time to provide a
response. The response was given by clicking on a particular
letter on the keyboard that corresponded with one of three word
colors (blue, green, and red) on the screen. The reaction time
was measured in milliseconds (ms; measurement error = 1 ms).
We included three groups of words: neutral, anxiety-related,
and test anxiety-related (see Supplementary Table 1). Anxiety-
related words were derived from Becker et al. (2001), test
anxiety-related words taken from Lawson (2006), whereas neutral
words were derived from both articles (for more details, see
the Supplementary Material). Each word was presented three
times, in a different order, and a different color. Participants were
instructed to react as fast as possible to the colors of the word
and to ignore its content. The total number of trials was 108 (12
words× 3 word groups× 3 colors). Prior to the experiment trials,
participants were presented with 15 (5 words× 3 colors) practice
trials with neutral words (e.g., Belt, Candle, Map). The reaction
time for neutral, anxiety-related, and test anxiety-related words
per condition was calculated as the average response latency to all
stimuli presented from the corresponding category of words.
Procedure
We used a within-subject design in order to investigate whether
a non-symptomatic sample is able to produce the MST effect
considered to reflect genuine test anxiety complaints. To avoid
carry-over effects, we always started with the honest session and
approximately 1 week later the feign session took place. During
the first session (T1), participants were instructed to respond
honestly to the BSI-18 and the SRSI. They were also presented
with the MST containing neutral, anxiety-related, and test-related
words, and asked to name the color of the word as fast as possible,
without focusing on the meaning of the words. Participants were
first given the opportunity to practice with the task. After 15
practice trials, participants completed 108 active trials. During
the second session (T2), participants were first given a vignette
that described the following scenario (see the Supplementary
Material for English version2): a student with serious test anxiety
2A Dutch (original) version of the instructions can be obtained from the first
author.
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has to leave school to care for his/her ill mother. Therefore, this
student is not able to take an exam that is necessary for passing
the academic year. The only chance to still pass the academic
year is to have his/her best friend talk to the exam committee
as if he/she were the person with test anxiety. So, the friend
has to convince the committee of the seriousness of the test
anxiety by completing an anxiety-test and feign test anxiety. If
the exam committee is not convinced of the test anxiety, the
person with high test anxiety has to retake the whole academic
year. Participants read the vignette and were then informed that
if they were convincing in feigning test anxiety, they would take
part in a lottery in which they could win an extra bonus of €20.
After reading the vignette, participants filled in the SRSI again
and had the MST once more. The participants did not receive
any specific instruction how to respond to the task that followed.
At the end of the second session, participants were asked to fill
out a questionnaire. In this questionnaire, participants were asked
to rate their understanding of the task; the plausibility of the
vignette; and also their motivation, success, and their opinion
about the task difficulty on a five-point Likert scale (anchors:
1 = Low; 5 = High). Our primary interest was in whether non-
symptomatic participants exhibit the typical MST effect when
they are instructed to feign. Because participants with raised
anxiety levels might obscure MST results, we excluded students
with BSI-18 scores that exceeded the cut-off.
Statistical Analysis
Because our data were skewed, we used non-parametric tests,
notably the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test and r for effect size using
the formula proposed by Rosenthal (1994); z/
√
N(number of
observations) and Mann–Whitney U-test. According to Cohen
(1988) criteria, the interpretation of r value is as follows:
0.1 = small effect, 0.3 = medium effect, and 0.5 = large effect. For
clarity’s sake, we report means and standard deviations.
RESULTS
Exit Questionnaire
Participants’ understanding of the task was high (M = 4.32,
SD = 0.78), and they found the task moderately plausible
(M = 3.77, SD = 0.75). Participants did not experience great
difficulty in carrying out the task (M = 2.18, SD = 0.91).
Furthermore, students were moderately motivated (M = 4.00,
SD = 0.87), and they judged the success of their performance as
rather modest (M = 2.77, SD = 0.61).
Endorsement of SRSI Pseudosymptoms
From T1 to T2, there was a significant increase in endorsement
of both genuine symptoms and pseudosymptoms, Z = 4.10,
p< 0.001, r = 0.62, and Z = 4.11, p< 0.001, r = 0.62, respectively.
Importantly, at T2, the large majority of participants (n = 13;
77%) scored above the cut-off of nine pseudosymptoms. Looking
at separate subscales of pseudosymptoms, it was apparent that
the rise in pseudosymptoms was particularly evident for the
Anxiety/Depression/PTSD subscale (Z = 4.12, p< 0.001, r = 0.62;
see Supplementary Table 2). As to SRSI subscales that involve
genuine symptoms, raised symptom scores during T2 were also
particularly evident for the PTSD/Anxiety (Z = 4.13, p < 0.001,
r = 0.62) and Depression (Z = 4.12, p< 0.001, r = 0.62). All in all,
these significant increases in symptom endorsement indicate that
our instructions to feign test anxiety at T2 were effective.
Table 1 shows mean BSI-18 scores (only T1), mean SRSI (T1
and T2) scores, and Stroop latency data for the three categories of
words (T1 and T2).
The MST Effect
Response latencies during T2 were significantly longer than those
during T1 (Table 2). This was true for neutral words: Z = 3.65,
p < 0.001, r = 0.55, anxiety-related words: Z = 3.94, p < 0.001,
r = 0.60, and test anxiety-related words: Z = 3.81, p < 0.001,
r = 0.57.
Comparing latencies between word categories revealed no
significant differences at T1 (all Z’s < 1.35, all p’s > 0.18).
However, at T2, differences emerged. The reaction time was
significantly longer when anxiety-related words were presented
compared with neutral words, Z = 2.84, p = 0.005, r = 0.43. The
same pattern emerged when comparing latency for test-anxiety
words with that for neutral words, Z = 2.06, p = 0.039, r = 0.31.
The difference between anxiety and test-anxiety words remained
insignificant (p = 0.20) (Table 2).
The magnitude of the MST effect at T2 (M = 44.75, SD = 92.65)
was significantly larger than at the T1 (M = −3.15, SD = 31.72),
Z = 2.06, p = 0.039, r = 0.313.
Furthermore, we compared the MST effect at T2 between
participants who scored above (n = 17) and participants who
scored under the cut-point on the SRSI (n = 5). The MST effect in
SRSI high scorers (M = 42.92, SD = 100.74) was not significantly
raised from not detected feigners (M = 51.01, SD = 66.45), Mann–
Whitney U-test = 38.00, z = −0.35, p = 0.724), but this might be
due to the small sample size.
DISCUSSION
The MST has been proposed as a method for detecting pathology-
related attentional bias (e.g., Becker et al., 2001). Some authors
(Buckley et al., 2003; Constans et al., 2014; but see Thomas and
Fremouw, 2009) have argued that the MST involves a reaction
time pattern that is difficult to simulate and that therefore flags
genuine psychopathology (e.g., PTSD). For example, Constans
et al. (2014, p. 83) reasoned that it is “unlikely that someone who
feigns PTSD symptoms could (1) correctly deduce that PTSD is
associated with slightly slower responding on combat words, and
(2) adjust color-naming response time to create the desired MST
effect.”
The current study examined whether an MST effect can be
obtained when non-symptomatic students are instructed to feign
test anxiety. Our findings can be summarized as follows. First,
looking into the SRSI scores, our feigning instructions were
successful, meaning that they triggered the expected symptom
3Due to the nature of the tests (ranks), the relative distance remains unchanged,
hence, the same outcomes as for the MST effect at T2.
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TABLE 1 | Means and standard deviations of the BSI-18 scores (only T1), SRSI genuine symptoms and pseudosymptoms scores (T1 and T2), and MST latency data on
neutral, anxiety, and test anxiety words in both conditions (N = 22).
Measures T1 T2 Wilcoxon signed rank test r
M (SD) M (SD) Z
BSI-18 3.77 (2.37) / / /
SRSI Genuine symptoms 6.82 (4.72) 31.27 (7.37) 4.10∗∗ 0.62
Pseudosymptoms 1.23 (1.85) 15.64 (8.94) 4.11∗∗ 0.62
Stroop task (ms) Neutral 512.95 (65.68) 745.63 (285.78) 3.65∗∗ 0.55
Anxiety 517.10 (80.54) 795.95 (267.54) 3.94∗∗ 0.60
Test anxiety 509.81 (75.68) 790.39 (286.01) 3.81∗∗ 0.57
∗∗p < 0.001; T1, honest way of responding; T2, feigning test anxiety. BSI-18, Brief Symptom Inventory; and SRSI, the Self-Report Symptom Inventory.
TABLE 2 | Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests (Z) and significance levels for differences in
reaction times between different pairs at T1 and T2.
Pair of words T1 T2
Z p Z p r
Neutral–anxiety −0.50 0.61 2.84 0.005 0.43
Anxiety–test anxiety 0.27 0.78 1.28 0.200 0.19
Neutral–Test anxiety 1.35 0.18 2.06 0.039 0.31
T1, honest way of responding; T2, feigning test anxiety.
over-endorsement pattern in feigning condition. That is, at
T2 (feigning session), participants endorsed significantly more
genuine and pseudosymptoms on the SRSI than at T1 (honest
control session). The dominant strategy among participants
instructed to feign test anxiety was to raise all symptom
scores. However, symptom over-endorsement was particularly
pronounced for anxiety-related symptoms. Furthermore, using
the cut-off of 9, the SRSI pseudosymptoms subscale was able to
detect 77% of participants in the feigning condition (T2).
Second, and most importantly, when participants were
instructed to feign test anxiety (T2) without being informed
about the MST effect, they produced longer reaction times
for all three types of words. This overall slowing down likely
reflects the increased cognitive load that is caused by feigning
(see Vrij et al., 2008). However, a similar response pattern
might be produced by patients, who are processing emotionally
provocative material. Even though our study design limits us
in discussing how would a genuine test anxiety group respond
to the MST, we do know from the literature (e.g., Lawson,
2006) that the expected response pattern would be the MST
effect. Some researchers, such as Buckley et al. (2002), even
consider an overall delayed response latency to be a sign of
genuine complaints. We disagree with this position. That is to
say, genuine psychopathology might lead to delayed reaction
times, but not each instance of a delayed reaction indicates
psychopathology. For example, in one recent study (Boskovic
et al., unpublished), we applied the MST to three groups:
participants who had experienced high impact life events,
participants with low impact life experiences, and actors, with
low impact experiences, but coached to feign PTSD-related
symptoms. We found the most delayed RTs in the actors
(feigning) group, which opposes the position of Buckley et al.
(2002). However, claiming that longer RTs can help detecting
feigning, would be equally an overstatement of the case. The
issue here is of course that people who feign symptoms on
the MST are likely to produce longer response latencies (e.g.,
Boskovic et al., unpublished), yet people who exhibit longer
response latencies are not necessarily feigning. For example,
Becker et al. (2001) compared MST performance of people with
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), people with SP, and non-
anxious participants. People with GAD had the overall longest
reaction time while responding to both GAD-related and SP-
related words.
Additionally, besides overall longer response latencies,
participants specifically exhibited longer reaction times when
responding to anxiety-related and test anxiety-related words
compared with neutral words when feigning (i.e., the MST
effect). This differential response pattern was not evident
during the honest control session (T1). Thus, instructed
students were able to simulate the MST effect in the feigning
condition, indicating that this effect alone does not rule out
feigning as previous studies claimed (e.g., Buckley et al., 2003;
Constans et al., 2014). Our findings suggest that feigning and
the cognitive load it induces (e.g., Cannon, 2003) might result
in a response latency pattern (i.e., the MST effect) that closely
resembles a response pattern that is widely considered to be a
sign of genuine symptomatology. Cannon (2003) speculated
that the MST effect reflects current concerns rather than
authenticity of the complaints. This interpretation makes sense,
given that people who are motivated to simulate a certain
type of psychological problem will be preoccupied with key
words referring to the features constituting that problem.
The additional cognitive load caused by instructions to feign
certain problems may in itself be sufficient for longer response
latencies.
Even though both Buckley et al. (2003) and Constans et al.
(2014) observed pronounced MST effects for trauma-related
words in PTSD patients, there are several issues that preclude
a straightforward interpretation of their findings. For example,
Buckley et al.’s study relied on a small sample of actors, PTSD
patients, and non-anxious controls (each n = 6; N = 18). The
findings by Constans et al. (2014) actually fit nicely with our
study, although the authors come up with a completely different
interpretation of their results. The MST effect in their study was
most pronounced in PTSD patients who were over-reporting
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symptoms on the M-FAST (Miller, 2001). Thus, it is a distinct
possibility that the delayed reaction times on the MST in
this group did reflect preoccupation with symptoms that were
intentionally exaggerated rather than an attentional bias related
to genuine PTSD.
A few limitations of the current study warrant comment. First,
participants were tested during two different sessions, separated
by a 1-week interval. This could possibly have resulted in a
learning effect, because the tasks in the two sessions shared
the same content. Participants had to react differently to the
same tasks during the two sessions and we assumed that a
learning effect was limited in this way. Still the within-subject
design we employed might have influenced our results. However,
if anything, one would expect that, during the retest, practice
would have speeded up Stroop performance, thereby lowering the
chances of finding a specific MST effect. If the learning effect did
occur, then one can assume that the actual differences between the
two conditions might be larger than what we observed. Second,
we instructed students to feign test anxiety, a condition that will
be relatively easy for them to relate to. Participants’ gratings of
the difficulty to feign test anxiety indicated that students did not
experience significant troubles in fabricating this particular issue.
Whether students who are instructed to feign panic disorder,
PTSD, or another less prevalent anxiety disorder also manifest
an MST effect remains to be seen. Third, our findings are based
on a non-symptomatic sample, therefore, we are restricted for
making any conclusion regarding the responses of a genuine
test anxiety group. We wanted to investigate whether providing
a healthy, non-symptomatic sample with feigning instructions
would produce a response pattern that is assumed to represent
genuine test anxiety complaints (i.e., the MST effect). However,
comparing feigners with a symptomatic group would be a logical
and a necessary next step in investigating the meaning of the
MST effect. It might well be the case that both groups exhibit
MST effects, but that those in genuine patients are much higher
than those in feigners. Finally, the employed within-subject
design limited the in-depth analysis of the diagnostic utility of
the MST (e.g., the ROC), which should be further explored.
Future studies might also want to test patients instructed to
feign certain conditions, which is not without ethical problems.
Including people with genuine symptoms would imply that one
would instruct half of them to deny problems and/or exaggerate
problems, which is problematic. However, that would enable
researchers to investigate more precisely the utility of both the
MST and the SRSI in differentiating individuals who experience
genuine symptoms from those who feign symptoms.
To sum up, we found that the MST effect could be relatively
easy to elicit with feigning instructions (see also Cannon,
2003). Thus, the MST effect is not only sensitive to genuine
psychopathology (Kimble et al., 2009), but also to the additional
cognitive load (e.g., preoccupation of healthy people with certain
themes and topics) caused by feigning, which introduces noise in
the strength of this effect across clinical groups (e.g., people with
PTSD). This may explain why Kimble et al. (2009) found that the
MST effect is sometimes difficult to replicate. It might well be the
case that our current understanding of the MST effect is hindered
by a publishing bias (e.g., file drawer problem) (Kimble et al.,
2009). Future work involving comparison of genuine patients and
participants who feign is necessary in order to closely examine
the quality and the utility of the MST effect in the symptom
validity assessment. However, given the fragility of any MST-
related findings, one needs to be careful in making diagnostic
decisions only using isolated thresholds, such as reaction time.
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